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This paper examines the effects of decoupling policies on Greek cotton production 
under the hypothesis that producers face uncertainty about output price and quantity. 
Using our estimation results we simulate the effects on cotton production under four 
alternative policy scenarios: the ‘Old’ CAP regime (i.e. the policy practiced until 
2005), the Mid Term Review regime, a fully decoupled policy regime and a free trade-
no policy scenario. Our results indicate the decoupled payment will have two 
contradictious effects on risk aversion. Producers become less risk averse through the 
wealth effect but more risk averse because of the increased output variance. The 
overall result of these two effects depends on the degree of risk aversion by farmers. 
We found that when the degree of risk aversion is high the wealth effect is positive. 
However, in the case of low risk aversion and a wealth effect equal to zero the 
decoupled payments become production neutral.  
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1. Introduction  
The 2003 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a major change in 
the way that farmers receive income support by the European Union. In particular, 
under the Mid Term Review of CAP all compensatory payments given in the context 
of the previews reform packages (McSharry Reform in 1992, AGENDA 2000 in 1999) 
were replaced by a Single Farm Payment (SFP). This payment is based on historical 
payments while being entirely decoupled from the kind and/or the level of production 
(OECD, 2004). 
As  it  is  well-known  from  previous  studies  (Hennessy  1998,  Sckokai  and  Moro 
2006, Katranidis and Kotakou, 2008) a fully decoupled policy becomes coupled in the 
presence of uncertainty and risk. Under the assumption that producers are risk averse, 
the decoupled payments affect production through the wealth effect. This effect arises 
when a policy measure affects producers’ total wealth: if wealth increases producers 
become less risk averse and (as a consequence) they produce more. However, this is 
the case where producers face uncertainty only about output price so the variability of 
profits i.e. the source of uncertainty, depends on the price variance (Hennessy 1998).  
In the present study we examine the effect of decoupled payment on production 
when producers face uncertainty about output price and quantity. Under the hypothesis 
that both output and price are uncertain, the variability of profits depends on the price 
and output variance. Given that prices are determined by the market, the price variance 
is determined by the market as well so producers’ decisions cannot affect it. However, 
this  is  not  the  case  for  the  output  variance.  Any  producers’  decision  that  affects 
production will also affect the variability of production. In this way, the decoupled 
payment will have two effects on the degree of risk aversion of producers.  
The first effect is the known “wealth effect”: the decoupled payment increases the 
total wealth of producers so if producers are risk averse their degree of risk aversion 
decreases. The second effect takes place through the relation between the wealth and 
the output variance: the decoupled payment increases the wealth and since the output 
variance is a positive function of wealth it will be increased due to payment. The 
increased output variance will increase the degree of producers’ risk aversion. These 
two effects contradict each other since the first decreases the degree of risk aversion 
and the second increases the degree of risk aversion. As a result, in order to conclude 
about the effects of the decoupled payment on production we have to consider both 
effects.    3 
On the other hand, the degree of risk aversion may be substantially different among 
the farmers. Particularly, the degree of risk aversion is affected by the farm size (Saha, 
1997). Risk aversion is inversely related to the level of wealth, i.e. farms with lower 
income and wealth tend to be more risk averse than large farms with significantly 
greater wealth. As we mentioned earlier, decoupled payments will increase the level of 
wealth  and  will  decrease  the  level  of  risk  aversion.  The  drop  in  risk  aversion  is 
expected to be greater for small farms than their “larger” counterparts. In this light, we 
examine the effect of decoupled payments on production for small, medium and large 
sized farms.  
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of decoupling policies on Greek 
cotton production. We have chosen cotton, not only because of its great importance for 
Greek agriculture, but mainly because, especially for cotton, a mix of partial and fully 
decoupled measures has been adopted after 2005. According to the initial European 
Commission’s regulation, under the MTR regime, 65% of the total amount of subsidies 
producers’ received throughout 2000-2002 (i.e. the reference period), will be paid to 
producers as a fixed payment independent of the level of production. The rest 35% of 
the  total  amount  of  subsidies  will  be  transferred  to  producers  as  an  area  payment 
(European  Commission,  2007).  However,  in  June  2008  European  Commission 
changed the first regulation for cotton sector.  In line with the second regulation, 65% 
of  the  total  amount  of  subsidies  remains  the  same  (i.e.  as  it  was  in  the  initial 
regulation) but the rest 35% is subject to national base areas, fixed yields and reference 
amounts.  The  national  base  area  for  Greece  is  250.000  ha,  fixed  yields  are  3.2 
tonnes/ha and the reference amount per hectare is 251.75€ (European Commission, 
2008). This regulation is applied from 1
st January 2009.  
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the total budget which is available for the 
area payment is fixed and this implies that if the total cultivated land increases then the 
amount  of  the  area  payment  per  producer  will  decrease.  On  this  ground,  the  area 
payment relates to fluctuations in world prices since the level of production and as a 
result cultivated land depend on them.  
The  above  policy  mix  renders  the  evaluation  as  well  as  the  comparison  of  the 
effects  of  various  alternative  policies  on  cotton  production  a  significant  research 
objective. In this context, we have decided to examine and comparatively review the 
effects of a) the ‘Old’ CAP regime (i.e. the policy practiced until 2005), b) the new 
MTR regime which is a combination of partially and fully decoupled measures, c) a   4 
full decoupling system which probably could be applied in the next years and d) a free 
trade scenario which could also be adopted especially in the period after 2013.  
In respect of the paper’s structure, the following section presents a literature review 
on decoupling practices research that has been implemented in Europe or elsewhere. In 
sections three and four, we present the theoretical framework and the data that are used 
in the present study. In the ensuing fifth part, we present the estimation and simulation 
results as well as a rounded discussion of them. Finally, in the sixth section we put 
forward the main conclusions of our study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Decoupling  policies  in  the  farm  sector  have  been  thoroughly  examined  by  a 
significant number of researchers in Europe and elsewhere, especially in the US, over 
the last 15 years. Although these studies have followed different theoretical approaches 
and  examined  different  products  in  several  countries  and  under  partly  different 
decoupling regimes they have come to a common conclusion: All different kinds of 
decoupling policies affect farmers ’production decision.  
Although this is an expected result for partly decoupled measures, it is of a special 
interest in the case of fully decoupled policies, since it contradicts their main property 
namely their neutrality towards realized production. In the remainder of this section we 
put forward a short presentation of the main studies on this topic.  
A fully decoupled policy becomes coupled in the presence of uncertainty and risk. 
The first study that analyzed the results of a decoupled policy taking into consideration 
uncertainty and risk was conducted by Hennessy (1998). He suggested a framework 
where, under the assumption that producers are risk averse, the decoupled payments 
affect production through two effects: the wealth effect and the insurance effect. The 
first  effect  arises  when  a  policy  measure  affects  producers’  total  wealth:  if  wealth 
increases producers become less risk averse and as a consequence they produce more. 
The  second  effect  takes  place  through  the  stabilization  of  farm  income,  when 
government increases payments so as to compensate producers for price reductions. 
Additionally,  Hennessy  checked  the  validation  of  the  proposed  model  with  a 
simulation  analysis  using  data  for  corn  production  in  Iowa.  The  obtained  results 
confirmed the existence of both effects.  
In a highly interesting paper, Serra et. al. (2006), analyzed the impact of decoupled 
payments on production by considering the effect that inputs have on output variability   5 
under the hypothesis that both output and output price are uncertain. They estimated 
production function alongside utility maximization conditions to examine the effect of 
the lump-sum payments on the mean and variability of output. They found that the 
elasticity of production with respect to lump-sum payments is positive. However, they 
came to the conclusion that when producers are risk averse and the inputs are risk 
increasing the positive effect of the payment on production disappears in practice.  
In another paper, Serra et.al. (2009) examined the effects of decoupled payments on 
land allocation and crop mix. In this study, they made the hypothesis that producers 
face uncertainty on output and produce “program” and “non-program” crops i.e. crops 
that producers receive a decoupled payment for their production and crops that there is 
no policy for them. They found that under the hypothesis that producers are risk averse 
an increase in decoupled payment will increase farmers’ willingness to assume more 
risk. This way an increase in decoupled payments will motivate farmers to reduce land 
allocated to program crops in favor of non-program crops.  
Féménia et.al. (2008), examined the wealth effect of decoupled payments from a 
different point of view. Under the hypothesis that farmers face uncertainty about prices 
they distinguished farmers in two categories: a) farmers who do not own land and b) 
farmers who own part of their land. In the case that farmers do not own land decoupled 
payments are capitalized in land values and they do not actually obtain the benefits of 
the payments. Their results indicate that when producers do not own land they reduce 
production by 1.11% even if they receive the payment.  
Maki  et.al.  (2005),  analyzed  the  effects  of  decoupled  payments  on  farm-level 
income variability, crop choice and land allocation under the hypothesis that producers 
face uncertainty about output and prices. Their results indicate that decoupled payment 
will increase farm income significantly, particularly in the years when prices are low. 
As for the land allocation, they found that farmers will allocate more land to crops with 
higher payments rates.  
Last  but  not  least,  in  a  very  interesting  paper,  Sckokai  and  Moro  (2006)  have 
simulated the effects of AGENDA 2000 and MTR regime on cultivated land of arable 
crops in Italy under price uncertainty. Using FADN farm level data, they found that the 
corn and oilseeds acreage is going to be increased but the opposite holds for durum 
wheat and other cereals acreage. Yet, the most interesting finding is that decoupled 
payments are not production neutral since the positive wealth and insurance effects 
will compensate the negative price effect in all cases. Additionally, according to their   6 
estimated coefficients of relative risk aversion, as farm size increases the degree of risk 
aversion decreases, which means wealthier farms are less risk averse. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this section we present the model which specifies farmer’s risk preferences. We 
assume  non-linear  mean  variance  risk  preferences  which  mean  that  absolute  risk 
aversion is non-constant (Coyle (1999), Sckokai and Moro (2006)). Producers’ risk 
preferences are specified through a mean-variance utility function: 
2 ( , )  (1) w U U W σ =  
where W and 
2
w σ  are the mean and variance of final wealth which are uncertain due to 
price and output uncertainty that producers face. The certainty equivalent of this type 
of utility function is  
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Additionally, we assume that the coefficient of risk aversion depends on wealth 
and wealth variance and preferences are specified as follows: 
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This specification of preferences proposed by Saha (1997) where the risk attitude 
depends on the value of parameters γ and θ, i.e. the producers will be risk averse, risk 
neutral or risk lovers for different values of γ and θ
1. In our case, we assume that 
preferences are specified as Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). This is the case 
where γ = θ, and θ>1, so the coefficient of risk aversion becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )





                                                 
1 Saha (1997) provides all the alternative values of γ and θ that specifies risk attitudes.    7 
From the above specification it is clear that as wealth increases the degree of risk 
aversion decreases and as the wealth variance increases the degree of risk aversion 
increases. Moreover, it is also clear that as θ increases the coefficient of risk aversion 
will take larger values i.e. farmers become more risk averse.  
The expected profits are equal to: 
   (5) py wx π = −  
where y is the expected output quantity,  pcorresponds to expected output price, w ,x 
are prices and quantities of variable inputs respectively.  
The production follows the Just-Pope (year) technology and is equal to: 
1/2 ( ) ( )    (6) y a x b x ε = +   
where x are the nonstochastic inputs and ε corresponds to a stochastic weather variable 
with  mean  ε and  variance 
2
ε σ .  The  mean  and  variance  of  output  are 
1/2 ( ) ( ) y a x b x ε = + and 
2 2 ( ) y b x ε σ σ = correspondingly. If we substitute the mean output 
to expected profits we obtain the expected profit as follows: 
1/2 ( ) ( )    (7) py wx pa x pb x wx π ε = − = + −  
Additionally, the variance of profits is given by the following equation: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = ( ) + + ( )    (8) w y p p y p p p y p b x y b x π ε ε σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ = = + +  
where 
2
p σ   is  the  variance  of  expected  price.  According  to  the  foregoing  analysis 
producers will maximize the expected utility function of the form: 
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 The expected utility function satisfies the following properties:  
a)  It is increasing in output price and initial wealth, decreasing in input prices 
and variance of expected output price. 
b)  Under  CRRA  preferences,  it  is  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  expected 
output  price,  input  prices,  initial  wealth  and  variance  of  expected  output 
price.   8 
c)  It is continuous and differentiable so we obtain the supply, derived demands 
and output variance as follows
2: 
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d)  Under DARA preferences is quasi-convex in( ) 0, , W p w . 
e)  The standard symmetry and reciprocity conditions hold.  
In order to estimate the coefficients of the supply and derived demand functions we 
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Applying the derivative property in equation (10) supply, derived demands and output 
variance functions are specified as follows:  
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where b, c, d, e, are the coefficients to be estimated.  
We  model  price  expectations  using  the  hypothesis  that  each  period  producers 
expect that price will be equal to the price that they received the previous period that 
is: 
1 ( )   (14) t t t E P P− =  
                                                 
2 Proofs of these equations are available from the authors upon request.   9 
Moreover, we generate expected output values by running the following regression: 
1    (15) t t t y y e γ δ − = + +  
where yt is the output at time t, yt-1 is the output at time t-1 and et is the error term.  
As for the computation of expected output price variance, we used the formula that 
first proposed by Chavas and Holt (1990). According to their formula, variance of 
expected output price is equal to the weighted sum of squared differences between 
actual prices and their expected values: 
2 2
, , 1 ,
1
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j
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where weights ωj are equal to 0.50 and 0.33 respectively
3. 
The same formula is applied to calculate the weather variable variance which follows: 
2 2
, , 1 ,
1
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j
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=
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We model output variance as follows: 
2 2 var    (18) y l q σ =  
where l is the cultivated land and varq is the variance of yield and is computed by 
using the formula described above. 
Additionally, since we wanted to measure the risk attitude of farmers according to 
their farm size we computed the coefficient of relative risk aversion as follows: 
1 1 2 2 2 2 +   (19) c d d d θ θ θ θ = +  
where d1, d2 and d3 are dummy variables that distinguish three types of farm size: small 
sized farms, medium sized farms and large sized farms. We distinguish farm size by 
economic farm size that provided by F.A.D.N. data. According to standard F.A.D.N. 
methodology, there are ten categories of farm size and our sample consists of farms 
that belong to first nine categories. Details about the way that farms are grouping into 
nine categories are provided in Appendix. However, due to limitations in the number 
of  observations  in  each  category,  we  grouped  the  farms  into  three  size  categories. 
Firstly, the farms that belong to the first three categories are considered as small sized. 
Secondly, the farms that belong to the next three categories are considered as medium 
sized and finally the farms of the three last categories as large sized. 
                                                 
3 In Chavas and Holt (1990) study variance has three years time horizon but given that the weight in 
third year is small i.e. equal to 0.17 and because we did not want to lose observations we constructed the 
variance with two years time horizon.    10 
4. Data 
The data we use are from Farm Accountancy Data Network (F.A.D.N.) and the 
National Statistical Service of Greece. The data are in a farm level during the period 
1994-2002 and our dataset consists of 1555 observations which  correspond to 485 
farms. From the entire sample of farms that are characterized as cotton producers, we 
use the farms that produce only cotton as well as the farms that the proportion of 
cotton revenue to total revenue is equal or larger than 95%, so they are considered as 
pure cotton producers.  
Cotton farmers produce cotton using two variable inputs: labor and intermediate 
inputs
4 and two quasi-fixed inputs: land and capital. Cotton quantity and revenue are 
available  from  FADN  data  so  we  obtain  cotton  price  by  dividing  revenue  with 
quantity.  As  for  the  variable  inputs,  the  FADN  sample  contains  expenditures  and 
quantity of labor, but only expenditures intermediate inputs. The expenditures of the 
intermediate  inputs  are  divided  by  their  price  index  so  as  to  obtain  their  quantity 
measure. The quantity of land is available from FADN data and the value of capital is 
deflated by the capital price index to obtain its quantity measure. 
Initial wealth has been computed as the difference between total assets value and 
total debts value. Total wealth corresponds to the sum of initial wealth and expected 
revenue minus the variable cost. The F.A.D.N. database provides information for the 
area that each farm is established. Giving this information we use the temperature of 
the areas that cotton farmers exist as a weather proxy. Finally, we include a time trend 
to take into account the effect of technology change in the cotton production. Summary 








                                                 
4 This category includes all intermediate inputs of production like fertilizers, water, pesticides etc.   11 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Initial wealth (€)  93048.73  67904.75 
Total wealth (€)  105357.49  74972.29 
Expected cotton production (kilos)  36696.76  21410.57 
Expected cotton price (€/kilo)  0.81  0.07 
Cotton price variance  2.03  4.88 
Intermediate inputs (€)  9767.11  6683.79 
Intermediate inputs price
a  (Index)  197.48  15.44 
Labour (hours)  1738.66  977.49 
Labour price (€/hour)  1.97  0.46 
Land (ha)  10.47  7.13 
Capital (€)  22358.83  18131.87 
Temperature  21.57  0.93 
Variance of temperature  1.05  0.64 
Source: Own Computations 
a: Intermediate Inputs Price Index provided by National Statistical Service of Greece 
 
Equations  (11)  and  (12)  are  very  nonlinear  in  parameters.  In  the  estimation 
procedure, in order to avoid the high nonlinearity in parameters of supply and derived 
demands functions, we divide them by the common denominator:  










∂ ∂ = − −  
Additionally,  following  Coyle’s  (1999)  suggestion,  we  substitute  equation  (13)  to 
supply function. 
We estimated a system of two equations: cotton supply and intermediate inputs 
demand  applying  the  Iterative  Nonlinear  SURE  method  in  SAS  9.1  econometric 
software. We imposed homogeneity condition using wage as a numeraire and we also 
imposed  the  symmetry  restriction.  Additionally,  in  order  to  maintain  the  curvature 




                                                 
5  The  property  d  states  that  utility  function  is  quasi-convex  in 0 ( , , ) W p w .  By  using  Cholesky 
decomposition we actually impose convexity which is a stronger condition.    12 
5. Estimation and Simulation Results 
In this section we present the estimation as well as the simulation results based on 
them for the evaluation of four alternative cotton policy regimes. As we noted in the 
introductory comments these regimes refer to: the ‘Old’ CAP regime that had been in 
action till 2005, the new MTR regime consisting of a combination of partial and fully 
decoupled measures, another fully decoupled system seen as an alternative to the MTR 
regime in the coming years and finally, a completely free market-no policy scenario, 
mainly used as a reference system.  
Table 3. Estimated parameters of supply, derived demand and output variance 


























































































Source: Own computations 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-values, significant at 0.05 level  
 
 
   13 
The obtained estimation results are presented in Table 3 above. It appears that in 
their vast majority the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and they have 
the correct sign. Cotton supply is increasing in cotton price and initial wealth and 
decreasing in cotton price variance and price of intermediate inputs. The demand of 
intermediate  inputs  is  decreasing  in  its  own  price  and  cotton  price  variance  and 
increasing in cotton price and initial wealth. As for the output variance, it is increasing 
in  variance  of  temperature  and  initial  wealth.  Additionally,  θ  coefficient  gradually 
decreases as farm size increases and this practically means that wealthier farmers are 
less risk averse than their “smaller” counterparts. Such findings are in line with results 
obtained in earlier studies (Sckokai and Moro 2006, Saha 1997). The obtained results 
make clear that small sized farms are more risk averse than medium sized farms and 
large sized farms are risk lovers.  
In Table 4, the elasticities of cotton supply and intermediate inputs demand with 
respect  to  cotton  price,  initial  wealth,  cotton  price  variance  and  price  of  the 
intermediate  inputs  are  presented.  All  computed  elasticities  are  consistent  with 
economic theory, since they exhibit the correct sign. Cotton supply and intermediate 
inputs demand are inelastic in their own price. Additionally, the elasticities of cotton 
supply and intermediate inputs with respect to initial wealth are positive which means 
that  as  initial  wealth  increases,  cotton  farmers  produce  more  and  demand  more 
intermediate inputs.  
Table 4. Elasticities of cotton supply and intermediate inputs demand 






Cotton  0.336  -0.516  0.245  -0.004 
Intermediate Inputs  0.430  -0.659  0.330  -0.003 
      Source: Own computations 
     Note:  Elasticities are computed at the sample mean values 
We now turn to our simulation strategy. Using the estimated cotton supply, FAPRI 
projections on cotton world prices until 2013 (FAPRI, 2009) and USDA projections on 
CPI in Greece until 2013
6 (USDA 2009), we have simulated the effects of the four 
alternative policy scenarios presented earlier on. In order to evaluate the ‘Old’ CAP 
regime,  we  increased  the  cotton  world  price  by  the  amount  of  mean  subsidy  per 
kilogram  that  producers  received  during  the  period  2000-2002  (i.e.  the  reference 
                                                 
6 We used CPI projections in order to deflate subsidies from 2006 to 2013.     14 
period for MTR reform). Obviously, in this case the wealth effect on cotton production 
has been zero.  
Furthermore, we have assessed the MTR reform (i.e. a combination of fully and 
partially decoupled policy regime) through changes in prices and initial wealth. We 
increase initial wealth by 65% of the total subsidies producers received during the 
reference  period  (2000-2002).  We  also,  increased  world  price  projections  by  the 
remaining 35% of total subsidies per kilogram of production
7. In the full decoupling 
policy scenario (3
rd scenario) we assume that producers receive the world price and 
their  initial  wealth  is  increased  by  the  full  amount  of  subsidies  that  they  received 
during  the  reference  period  (2000-2002).  Moreover,  in  the  free  trade  scenario  we 
assume  that  production  depends  only  on  world  prices.  Finally,  we  recomputed  the 
cotton  price  variance  for  all  these  cases  in  order  to  consider  its  effect  on  cotton 
production.  
As we noted in the introductory comments, the payment increases the variance of 
output and consequently increases the degree of risk aversion. In order to take into 
account the effect of increased initial wealth due to subsidies in output variance and 
the degree of risk aversion we distinguish two cases. In the first case, under MTR 
reform and full decoupling scenario, we increase the initial wealth in cotton production 
and in variance of output. In the second case, under these scenarios, we increase the 
initial wealth only in cotton production i.e. we consider only the wealth effect on risk 
attitudes of farmers.  
We apply the simulation strategy described above in each farm size category so as 
to evaluate the effects of aforementioned policies by farm size. Tables 5, 6 and 7 report 
the percentage changes in cotton production under the three alternative regimes (‘Old’ 
CAP regime, MTR regime, full decoupling regime) taking as a reference the free trade-
no policy scenario for small, medium and large sized farms respectively. Elaborating 
on  the  results  of  each  individual  scenario,  we  come  to  realise  that  the  ‘Old’  CAP 
regime  distorts  production  more  than  any  other  alternative.  Under  this  regime, 
production  is  on  average,  compared  to  the  fourth-no  policy  scenario,  higher  by 
42.36%, 35.4% and 33.79%, for small, medium and large farms respectively.  
                                                 
7  In  order  to  evaluate  MTR  regime  we  take  into  account  the  provisions  of  the  first  European 
Commission’s regulation during the period 2006-2008 as well as the corresponding provisions of the 
second regulation during the period 2009-2013.    15 
In the case of the MTR regime the production distortion becomes smaller. When 
we consider the effects of the payment on output variance, the corresponding increases 
are 9.96%, 9.94% and 10.93% for small, medium and large farms respectively. On the 
other  hand,  if  we  assume  that  the  payment  does  not  affect  output  variance,  the 
production is higher by 9.48%, 9.32% and 9.88% for small, medium and large farms 
correspondingly. 
However,  the  most  interesting  results  in  terms  of  our  analysis  arise  when  we 
compare the full decoupling regime with the free trade-no policy scenario. In the case 
of small farms the production is on average smaller by 2.85% when we consider the 
effect of payment on output variance and by 3.39% if the payment does not increase 
variance. Farmers produce less under full decoupling relative to free trade-no policy 
scenario  since  their  marginal  risk  premium  is  smaller  because  of  the  payment. 
Additionally, the difference of 0.55% between the above two results is attributed to the 
effect of the payment on output variance and as a result on the degree of risk aversion 
of farmers. If the payment does not affect output variance farmers become less risk 
averse, their marginal risk premium becomes smaller and they produce less.  
In the case of medium farms when we consider the effect of payment on output 
variance, production under full decoupling is equal to the production under free trade-
no policy scenario. This practically means that the decrease of risk aversion due to 
payment, i.e. the wealth effect, is compensated by the increase of risk aversion due to 
increasing output variance. However, if the payment does not affect output variance 
production is smaller by 0.72% since farmers are less risk averse and this result is 
attributed to wealth effect. 
Finally, in the case of large farmers the situation is completely different since they 
are risk lovers. When the degree of risk aversion is larger i.e. when the payment affects 
output variance, they produce 2.02% more relative to free trade-no policy scenario. On 
the  other  hand,  when  the  degree  of  risk  aversion  decreases  their  production  is  on 
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Table  5.  Percentage  changes  in  cotton  production  in  relation  to  free  trade-no 
policy scenario, small sized farms 
  Payment affects production 
variance 
Payment does not affect production 
variance 












2006  48.76%  15.38%  -2.96%  48.76%  14.82%  -3.53% 
2007  44.54%  13.81%  -3.06%  44.54%  13.26%  -3.64% 
2008  41.14%  12.56%  -3.12%  41.14%  12.02%  -3.72% 
2009  46.20%  14.64%  -2.67%  46.20%  14.14%  -3.18% 
2010  42.86%  6.46%  -2.73%  42.86%  6.03%  -3.26% 
2011  39.97%  5.88%  -2.78%  39.97%  5.45%  -3.31% 
2012  38.46%  5.61%  -2.74%  38.46%  5.19%  -3.27% 
2013  36.98%  5.34%  -2.72%  36.98%  4.93%  -3.24% 
Source: Own computations 
          
Table  6.  Percentage  changes  in  cotton  production  in  relation  to  free  trade-no 
policy scenario, medium sized farms 
  Payment affects production 
variance 
Payment does not affect production 
variance 












2006  40.37%  14.38%  0.03%  40.37%  13.67%  -0.70% 
2007  37.50%  13.33%  -0.02%  37.50%  12.61%  -0.78% 
2008  35.17%  12.47%  -0.06%  35.17%  11.76%  -0.85% 
2009  37.72%  13.43%  0.04%  37.72%  12.81%  -0.60% 
2010  35.47%  6.95%  0.00%  35.47%  6.41%  -0.66% 
2011  33.48%  6.55%  -0.03%  33.48%  6.00%  -0.71% 
2012  32.31%  6.32%  -0.04%  32.31%  5.78%  -0.72% 
2013  31.17%  6.08%  -0.05%  31.17%  5.56%  -0.72% 
Source: Own computations 
 
Table  7.  Percentage  changes  in  cotton  production  in  relation  to  free  trade-no 
policy scenario, large sized farms 
  Payment affects production 
variance 
Payment does not affect production 
variance 












2006  38.37%  15.24%  2.17%  38.37%  14.03%  0.92% 
2007  35.94%  14.37%  2.18%  35.94%  13.15%  0.87% 
2008  33.97%  13.65%  2.19%  33.97%  12.42%  0.82% 
2009  35.58%  14.07%  1.95%  35.58%  13.01%  0.86% 
2010  33.68%  7.96%  1.95%  33.68%  7.04%  0.81% 
2011  31.98%  7.62%  1.95%  31.98%  6.69%  0.78% 
2012  30.90%  7.38%  1.92%  30.90%  6.47%  0.75% 
2013  29.86%  7.15%  1.89%  29.86%  6.26%  0.73% 
Source: Own computations   17 
Taking  into  consideration  the  aforementioned  results,  we  first  conclude  that  the 
closer we move to a more decoupled policy the smaller the distortion to production 
becomes.  Secondly,  it  becomes  apparent  that  the  degree  of  risk  aversion  affects 
farmers’ production decisions. Farmers with different risk attitudes for example risk 
averse and risk lovers’ farmers, behave completely different in terms of production 
decisions even if the same policy is applied to them. Additionally, the wealth effect 
that  arises  due  to  decoupled  payment  is  partly  or  totally  compensated  when  we 
consider the effect of the payment on output variance. The degree of compensation 
depends on the degree of risk aversion. For example, in the case of medium sized 
farms production under full decoupling is the same with production under free trade no 
policy scenario. This is the case where the wealth effect disappears in practice and the 
decoupled payment becomes production neutral. This result does not take place when 
we consider that producers face uncertainty only about output price (Katranidis and 
Kotakou, 2008). 
 
Table 8. Mean percentage changes in relation to free trade – no policy scenario by 
farm size.  
















Small  42,4%  10.0%  -2.8%  42,4%  9.5%  -3.4% 
Medium  35.4%  9.9%  0%  35.4%  9.3%  -0.7% 
Large  33.8%  10.9%  2%  33.8%  9.9%  0.8% 
Source: Own computations 
In the Table 8 above we present the mean percentage changes under the different 
policy regimes in relation to free trade-no policy scenario by farm size. The reported 
results make clear that under the ‘Old’ CAP regime the production gradually decreases 
as  farm  size  increases.  Additionally,  under  the  MTR  regime  there  is  no  large 
differentiation among the producers by farm size. However, under the full decoupling 
regime relative to free trade-no policy scenario small farmers reduce their production. 
Medium farmers produce the same under both policies i.e. MTR regime and free trade-
no policy scenario and large farmers produce more. These results make clear that a full 
decoupling policy will be harmful for small producers.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
All in all, in this study we have attempted to evaluate the effects of four alternative 
policy scenarios on Greek cotton production: the ‘Old’ CAP regime i.e. the policy in 
action until 2005, the new MTR regime adopted after 2005, a fully decoupled policy 
and  a  free  trade-no  policy  scenario  mainly  used  as  a  system  of  reference.  In  our 
analysis, we assumed that cotton producers face uncertainty over price and output and 
we  used  the  mean-variance  utility  function  approach  proposed  by  Coyle  (1999) 
making  the  hypothesis  that  risk  attitudes  depend  on  the  expected  wealth  and  its 
variance.  
Our estimation results indicate that the degree of risk aversion of cotton farmers is 
greatly influenced by farm size. In particular, we found that as the farm size increases 
the degree of risk aversion decreases. Small sized farms are more risk averse than 
medium size farms. As for the large sized farms, we found that they are risk lovers and 
this  is  reasonable  since  they  are  wealthier  than  their  “smaller”  counterparts.  This 
differentiation  to  the  degree  of  risk  aversion  among  the  farmers  means  that  a 
proportional  change  of  wealth  and  wealth  variance  due  to  decoupled  payment  has 
different effects on farmers risk attitudes and as a result on cotton production. A direct 
consequence  of  this  is  that  farmers  with  different  risk  attitudes  behave  completely 
different, in terms of production decisions, even if the same policy is applied to them.  
According  to  the  obtained  simulation  results  and  in  line  with  our  expectations 
production gradually decreases as farmers’ support becomes decoupled to production. 
However,  in  order  to  come  to  the  right  conclusions  about  the  effect  of  decoupled 
payment on production we have to consider not only its effect on total wealth but also 
its effect on wealth variance. Our results indicate that the decrease of risk aversion 
which arises due to decoupled payment, i.e. the wealth effect, is partially or totally 
compensated by an increase of risk aversion due to the effect of the payment on output 
variance i.e. wealth variance. The degree of compensation depends on the degree of 
risk aversion.  In the case of small sized farmers, which  are more risk averse, this 
decrease of risk aversion due to decoupled payment is larger than the corresponding 
increase so the wealth effect is partially compensated. On the other hand, in the case of 
medium sized farmers, the wealth effect is totally compensated and this practically 
means that the decoupled payment becomes production neutral. This result does not 
take place when we consider that the only source of uncertainty is output price.  
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Appendix  
Each  farm  in  the  FADN  sample  has  its  own  size  which  is  determined  by  the 
Standard Gross Margin (SGM) of the output that produces. The SGM is defined as: 
SGM = value of output from one hectare or animal – cost of variable inputs required 
producing that output. The SGM is expressed in terms of European Size Units (ESU) 
which value is expressed as fixed number of euro. One ESU corresponds to 1200 
euros. The economic size classes in terms of ESU are presented in the following table: 
                         Table 1 Size class per category 
Category  Size Classes 
1  <2 ESU 
2  2-<4 ESU 
3  4-<6 ESU 
4  6-<8 ESU 
5  8-<12 ESU 
6  12-<16 ESU 
7  16-<40 ESU 
8  40-<100 ESU 
9        100 -<250 ESU 
10  >=250 ESU 
                Source: European Commission 
 